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Nilima Gulrajani explains that Increasing the aid budget as other departments cut theirs will
erode the long-run effectiveness of the development programme.
The Department for International Development (DFID) is a highly performing development
agency, the world’s best in many global rankings of aid donors and a powerful symbol of
Britain’s commitment to international development. Nevertheless, supporters of foreign aid
need to reflect on the value for money that their cause is getting with the coalition
government’s announcement to expand DFID’s budget as other
departments are slashed and burned. Immunity for DFID from fiscal belt-
tightening may not be desirable for achieving a sustainable and effective
foreign aid programme in the long run.
Eradicating global poverty is a complex task, particularly in the politically
messy environments of the developing world. DFID has managed to engage
in such contexts better than most. It is staffed by some of the foremost
experts on development, many of whom are located on the frontlines of the
impoverished communities they serve.
Notwithstanding calls for greater transparency and accountability, DFID has generally served as a model of
both these over the last 10 years when compared to other aid agencies. Government capability reviews
consistently praise DFID as an unqualified civil service success.
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why supporters of international development policy should be
wary of the announcement that Britain’s aid budget will increase by 50% over four years to £11.5bn.
Granting exceptional status to foreign aid increases the pressure on it to deliver quick, measurable wins. But
this is not the same thing as delivering long-lasting development impact. Making health systems run or
schools work or growth take off requires more than higher cash investment in hospitals, schools or roads.
For sustainable results, domestic champions for external engagement need to be created, political coalitions
need to be fostered, domestic resources must be mobilised to limit aid dependency and risks will generally
need to be taken. To date, DFID has been a champion of these innovative, softer and subtler forms of
engagement even as audit cultures have noticeably gained influence. But with even greater scrutiny and
value for money now essentially the quid pro quo for the massive expansion of its budget in a time of
retrenchment, DFID’s comparative advantage as a flexible and entrepreneurial donor is no longer politically
tenable.
With running costs reduced to 2% of total spending by 2015, in other words falling to half the global donor
average of 4%, DFID will be in the unusual position of having an increased budget managed with a reduced
headcount. This threatens to divert monies to quick-disbursing multilateral funds at the World Bank or United
Nations, where value for money can be even harder to ascertain. If we accept that poverty reduction is not
fundamentally a financial problem but a problem of weak institutions, pressures to disburse large sums of
money with limited staff oversight and in situations of fragile governance appear an unlikely recipe for
development success.
Meanwhile, as a greater percentage of aid resources now service strategic defence and foreign policy
objectives, this threatens the poverty-focus of British aid spending for which it has received worldwide kudos.
A case could be made that the growing links between development spending and national security betrays
the spirit of the2002 International Development Act, which stipulates that all UK aid must have the purpose of
sustainable development or welfare improvement and be likely to contribute to poverty reduction. It is
precisely in these surreal times of fiscal retrenchment that the government should be held to account for
maintaining its commitment to the act.
Winning the ministerial lottery in the comprehensive spending review is too high a price to pay for turning a
blind eye to the erosion of the aid programme’s raison d’etre. As the opportunity cost of development
spending becomes increasingly stark, public support for foreign aid falls. In a recent survey, 63% of
respondents thought aid needed to be cut to help deal with the budget deficit and over half did not support
the coalition government’s policy of ringfencing aid spending.
Singling DFID out for special treatment is sacrificing public support for aid that has been so critical for DFID’s
past successes. This looks set to worsen as DFID phases out programmes to foster development awareness
among the British public as part of recently announced efficiency savings measures. An entire generation of
supporters of sensible development and aid policies is now at risk of never being fostered.
A reasonable discussion is required of the ways programmatic and operational savings can be achieved in
DFID alongside its ministerial brethren without unduly threatening the modus operandi at DFID that has been
so successful to date. But let’s be clear; removing the ringfence should not be taken as an invitation to rip
into the foreign aid budget. There are lessons to be learned here from Canada’s debt-reduction programme
in the mid 1990s, when the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) bore a disproportionate
burden of departmental cuts (a three-year reduction of 20.5%) compared with foreign affairs and national
defence. Domestic development education programmes were also especially hard hit in Canada.
These cuts demolished CIDA’s size and profile to such a degree that they are still blamed for the decline of
Canada’s longstanding humane internationalist tradition. Their legacy is an electorate that has been content
to sacrifice global development on the altar of narrower domestic concerns, recently exemplified by Canada’s
relatively weak support for a global climate change deal at Copenhagen and a G20 pledge to support
maternal and child health conditional upon denying access to safe abortions to impoverished women. The
irony, perhaps, is that if diminishing public support is the legacy of dramatic and targeted cuts to foreign aid
in Canada, this legacy risks being exactly the same in Britain where the foreign aid budget is exceptionally
protected.
Be forewarned, Britain – a robust and sustainable foreign aid programme can only be maintained by
judicious evenhandedness in its fiscal management during these austere times.
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